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Faber,9 defendant, an experienced mechanical engineer, in consideration
of his employment as chief engineer and plant superintendent by plaintiff, an Ohio manufacturer of spray-painting equipment, agreed that he
would not engage in or work for any business in competition with that
of plaintiff in nineteen states, including Ohio, and in Ontario, Canada,
during his employment and for a period of five years thereafter, and also
from disclosing to anyone any confidential information of manufacture
or of the trade secrets of the plaintiff.
While defendant had worked for plaintiff since 1951, the above agreement was entered into in May, 1953. Defendant voluntarily left the employment of plaintiff in December, 1954, and shortly thereafter was employed by the Roll-Rite Company of Genoa, Ohio, which company at the
time was not a competitor of the plaintiff. During the first ten months
defendant worked for Roll-Rite, however, it manufactured and delivered
two spray-painting machines to a former Ohio customer of plaintiff, and
a spray-painting mask to another former customer of plaintiff. All three
pieces of equipment substantially incorporated the designs and techniques
of the plaintiff's products. The defendant later left the employ of RollRite when that company was advised of the provisions of the employment contract between plaintiff and defendant. Held: the evidence as to
a breach of the contract pertains to competitors and customers of the
plaintiff in the state of Ohio, and, therefore, plaintiff is reasonably entitled to injunctive relief for the duration of the five-year period. An
award of damages was denied on the basis of insufficient evidence as to
such damages.
ROBERT C. BENSING

CORPORATIONS
Fiduciary Obligation of Promoter - Secret Profits
During recent years, considerable attention has been devoted to the
nature and extent of fiduciary obligations owed in connection with corporate affairs. In Johndahl v. Colambus Trotting Assn., Inc.,' the Court
of Appeals of Franklin County was presented with several interesting
questions concerning a promoter's fiduciary relationship to the corporation which he has formed.
The key facts in the case may be simply stated. Prior to 1949, a
partnership, of which plaintiff was a member, conducted trotting races
at Hilliards, Ohio. Plaintiff and certain of his associates then decided to
9.

146 N.E.2d 447 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
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incorporate the business. Plaintiff became a director, president and manager of the corporation and received, in exchange for his partnership investment, 225 shares of its stock having a par value of $100 each. The
value of the partnership assets transferred was fixed at $92,500, per an
appraisal prepared by plaintiff.
After serving in such capacity for some two years, plaintiff tendered
his resignation (for reasons undisclosed). Shortly thereafter, he took
judgment on a cognovit note allegedly issued by the corporation to evidence a loan, the proceeds of which were used by the company to purchase
the stock of another shareholder. On motion, the common pleas court
suspended the judgment and defendant corporation filed an answer and
cross-petition asserting, inter alia, that plaintiff had realized a "secret
profit" of $10,000 by reason of misrepresentation of -his partnership
investment.
In reversing judgment for defendant on its cross-petition and remanding the case for further proceedings, the court of appeals held that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain the finding that plantiff realized any
such undisclosed profits. The court held, however, that plaintiff was a
promoter, in that he was instrumental in forming the corporation, negotiated for transfer of the partnership assets and became an officer and
director. While the corporation may recover secret profits made by a
person occupying the fiduciary relationship of a promoter, by failure to
disclose or by actual misrepresentation of the value of assets transferred,
the corporation has the burden to prove the amount of the profit reaped
by the promoter. To this end, it is first necessary to establish the market
value of the partnership assets at the time of transfer, which the corporation failed to do in the trial court.
In reaching this conclusion, the court gave considerable attention to
the test to be used in computing "secret profits." In its cross-petition,
defendant alleged that the promoter had represented the cost of his partnership interest to be in excess of $22,500, whereas he had in fact invested less than $12,500. The trial court, on the other hand, based
its decision on a finding that, at the time of transfer, the market value
of the assets was over $20,000 less than the figure determined by the
promoter. The court of appeals, after noting that the trial court had
departed from the theory set forth in the cross-petition, held that the
proper test is not what the promoter and his associates may have paid
for the interests of some of the other partners, but the value which they
received by such purchases, together with the value of the other holdings
of the partnership (as at the time of transfer). The court stressed that
1. 104 Ohio App. 118, 147 N.E.2d 101 (1956), motion to certify the record
overruled, October 17, 1956. See, 8 WEST. RES. L REV. 541 (1957).
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plaintiff had actually invested $18,500 in cash in partnership assets
which were turned over to the corporation, which did not include other
valuable assets such as the leasehold, which carried betting privileges, and
the concessions.
While the case is complicated by other procedural and evidentiary
questions, the decision seems eminently sound in that a realistic fiduciary
standard is applied which protects the interests of the corporation without
imposing an unduly harsh burden of proof upon the promoter. Such an
approach should aid Ohio practitioners and judges alike in resolving
future controversies involving fiduciary obligations of promoters.

Non-Profit Corporations - Election of Trustees
Another court of appeals decision 2 illustrates the significance of the
code of regulations in corporate affairs. The Prosecuting Attorney of
Franklin County brought an action in quo warranto, questioning the
validity of the election of trustees of a cemetery association organized in
1923 under the Ohio Non-Profit Corporation Law. The validity of the
election depended on whether those who participated and who attempted
to participate in the election of trustees were members and entitled to
vote at a meeting of the association. Under the code of regulations then
in force, a person could become a member of the association by purchasing a family lot, consisting of six grave spaces.
The court denied the writ, holding that the objecting party was not a
member within the meaning of this provision and therefore had no
right to nominate or challenge the results of an election. The court
likewise found no merit to the argument of estoppel arising from the
fact that seven out of the eleven trustees, who had served prior to the
meeting in question, were not members. They were trustees in fact,
since no one challanged their right to serve or their election, but the
court pointed out that this fact alone would not constitute them members with authority to vote and participate in meetings.

Officers and Agents - Authority to Bind Corporation
Two cases involved the authority of corporate officers and agents. In
Tenbusch v. L.K.N. Realty Company,3 a broker sought to recover a commission for finding a purchaser of improved realty. The president of
defendant corporation, with whom the plaintiff had negotiated exclusively,
2. State ex rel. Devine v. Baxter, 153 N.E.2d 452 (Ohio App. 1958), appeal dismissed, 168 Ohio St. 559 (1959). By the time the appeal was heard by the Supreme
Court of Ohio, the trustees had been re-elected and the Supreme Court thereupon
held that the questions presented had become moot.
3. 149 N.E.2d 42 (Ohio App. 1958). See also AGENCY section, supra.
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was the owner of 220 of the 250 outstanding shares of stock and was
also a director and treasurer of the company. His wife and two minor
sons owned all other outstanding shares, and the wife was a director and
secretary. The other director was also vice-president, but owned no stock
in the company.
Under these facts, the court held, as a matter of law, that the president had implied authority to offer corporate property for sale and that
the corporation was therefore .bound by the president's actions.4 The
court proceeded, however, to reverse a judgment for plaintiff and to
render final judgment for defendant on substantive contractual and evidentiary principles.
Guenther v. Downtown Mercury, Inc.,5 was an action for reformation
of a contract for purchase of an automobile, together with an accompanying chattel mortgage and insurance policy. In the execution of the chattel mortgage, the intended surety (-plaintiff), by mistake, signed the
mortgage on the line denoting him as the purchaser. On the basis of such
act, a policy of insurance was issued on his life as purchaser of the car.
The actual purchaser (plaintiff's son) died shortly thereafter, and plaintiff
found himself obligated for the unpaid balance without the benefit of
insurance.
In denying reformation, the majority of the court of appeals held
that even though the mistake may have been mutual as to the purchaser,
surety, dealer and finance company, there was no clear and convincing
evidence that the insurance company had any notice of the mistake. Despite evidence of a very close business relationship between the dealer,
finance company and insurance company, the court regarded them as
three independent business corporations. A close relationship is not, in
itself, proof of authority on the part of agents of one company to bind the
others by contract.
The dissenting judge emphasized the practical relationship of agents
of the three companies, and particularly those of the finance and insurance
companies. In fact, no medical examinations were required by the insurer if the risk was approved -by the finance company. On this basis,
the dissent would recognize a general contractual relationship between the
companies, sufficient to charge the insurance company with notice of the
mistake.
Considering the harsh result of the majority holding -in light of the
4. Cf., Miller v. The Wick Building Co., 154 Ohio St. 93, 93 NX.E.2d 467 (1950),
holding that a general manager had, as a matter of law, no authority to enter into
an agreement for the sale of corporate property.
5. 105 Ohio App. 125, 151 N.E.2d 749 (1958), motion to certify the record
overruled, April 30, 1958. See discussion in INsURANcz section, infra.
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undisputed facts of the case, there is seemingly considerable merit to the
view advanced by the dissenting opinion.
Corporate Obligations - Restrictions on Right of
Holder to Bring Suit
In Lichter v. Land Title Guarantee & Trust Company,6 an Ohio
Turnpike 'bondholder brought a class action to hold the tide company
primarily liable for return of money paid it by the Turnpike Commission,
incident to performance by the tide company of a contract declared to be
void. Judgment for the tide company was affirmed, since the bonds contained a provision that no holder of outstanding bonds should have the
right to institute suit, unless he previously had given notice to the trustee
and unless holders of not less than 10% of the bonds outstanding made
written request to the trustee. The plaintiff having failed to comply with
such provisions, the court of appeals held simply that the restrictions upon
the right of action of an individual holder of a series of corporate -bonds
were reasonable and therefore valid and enforceable.
Securities Exchange Act - Director's Liability for
Short-Swing Profits
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had occasion to decide a suit by a
corporation against one of its directors to recover profits resulting from
sale of common stock of the corporation within six months after acquisition, under Section 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act.7 The defendant
acquired convertible preferred stock (traded on the New York Stock Exchange) as a result of a merger, and became a director of the corporation.
More than three years later, he exercised the right to convert such shares
into common stock, to prevent a loss of about $9.00 per share pursuant
to action of the company in redeeming the preferred stock. Within six
months, defendant sold part of the common stock and realized a profit on
such sale.
Noting that the purpose of the statute is to curb short-swing speculation -by insiders, the court regarded the main issue to be whether defendant's acquisition of the common stock, upon conversion of his preferred stock, was a "purchase" within the meaning of Section 16(b).
The Sixth Circuit held that this transaction was not a "purchase," since it
was dictated by economic necessity and could not lend itself to the
speculation encompassed by the Act., The preferred stock, with its undilutable conversion privilege, was "in the objective judgment of the
6.
7.

150 N.E.2d 70 (Ohio App. 1957).
Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958) (appeal pending).
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market place," the economic equivalent of the common. The court also
stressed the fact that a full disclosure was made and all preferred shareholders were treated alike, and concluded:
While [defendant) could have sold preferred shares on the open market instead of converting them, it can hardly be said that a failure to sell
is tantamount to a purchase.8
Interestingly, the fact that the director was very inactive and was not
privy to any inside information was an entirely irrelevant consideration
in this case.
Profit Sharing and Retirement Benefits - Shareholders'
Ratification of Directors' Action
Berkwitz v. Humphrey9 involved a shareholder's derivative suit against
Pittsburgh-Consolidation Coal Company, a Pennsylvania corporation, and
George M. Humphrey and P. L. Ireland, two of its directors, challenging
provisions of a profit sharing and retirement plan (called the "Management Unit Plan") and a sale of Pittsburgh-Consolidation stock to the
directors. The shareholders sought an accounting of profits and damages
resulting from these transactions.
The Management Unit Plan, adopted by the company in 1946, provided additional annual compensation, without actual purchase by employees of the company's common stock, equal in amount to dividends
paid per share of common stock multiplied by the number of "units" held
by each employee under the plan. In addition, the plan provided for
deferred compensation upon retirement, measured by the increase in the
market value of common stock during employment. The market value
of the stock was to be determined as of the date of termination of employment or such other date within five years thereafter as the employee
might select.
Noting that the question presented was one of first impression, the
district court held that the plan was invalid, as to the retirement feature,
for failure of the compensation to 'bear "a reasonable degree of equivalence to the value of services." Likewise, the provision granting an employee the right to defer the valuation date until after his retirement was
held to be unreasonable per se, since any payment resulting from an increase in value after the employee ceased working would be a gift and
a clear misuse of corporate funds. While no affirmative relief could
be enforced against employees who were not parties to the action, the
court did enter an order restraining Pittsburgh-Consolidation from
8.

Id. at 346.

9. 163 F.Supp.78 (N.D.Ohio 1958).
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entering into any agreement or issuing any units in the future, pursuant
to the plan.
The court further found that the shareholders of the company had
never effectively ratified the Management Unit Plan. The proxy statement sent to shareholders, while describing the basic compensation features of the plan, did not set forth numerous significant details, and in
essence, sought approval only of a proposal to implement the plan by
setting aside stock for issuance and sale from time to time to provide
necessary funds. At no time was shareholder approval requested of the
plan itself with full knowledge of all pertinent facts.
The second cause of action involved a sale of Pittsburgh-Consolidation stock by an Ohio company to directors Humphrey and Ireland,
among others, by means of a sale of the stock to Pittsburgh-Consolidation
and immediate resale to the directors, with a large part of the purchase
price financed by Pittsburgh-Consolidation at the low interest rate of
2 %. While this action was subsequently ratified by an overwhelming
majority of the disinterested shares, the plaintiff shareholders contended
that this ratification was nullified by certain omissions from the proxy
statement requesting approval of the action taken by the board of directors.
After detailed consideration of each allegation, the district court held
that the ratification was effective, despite the omission of the following
items from the proxy statement:
(1) Information relative to the extent of ownership of the purchasing directors in the Ohio company selling the stock;
(2)
Statement that contemplated dividends of Pittsburgh-Consolidation would enable the directors to pay the principal and interest
on the loans; and
(3) Assurance that the directors would continue to be associated
with the company.
The court concluded that although the "terms of the loans were unusually
favorable to the borrowers," the action was approved by a substantial
majority of the disinterested shareholders with full knowledge of all
significant terms and conditions.
While the district court stated that its decision was governed by
Pennsylvania law, the import of the principles announced and applied
therein is nonetheless significant for Ohio lawyers, because of the novelty
of the questions presented. The case may well become a landmark decision, particularly in the area of deferred compensation.
JERRY

B.
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